

**Attachment RJL-5**

**Bidding Rules for**

**The Dayton Power and Light Company's**

**CBP Auctions**

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

These Bidding Rules apply to the competitive bidding process ("CBP") auctions to procure supply for the provision of Standard Service Offer supply ("SSO Supply") for all of the retail customers that take retail generation service from The Dayton Power and Light Company.

Bidders also need to be familiar with other documents for the auctions including the Master Standard Service Offer Supply Agreement ("Master SSO Supply Agreement"), the Part 1 Application, the Part 2 Application, and the Communications Protocols. Bidders also should visit the Information Website regularly for up-to-date information including information specific to each auction.

The URL for the Information Website is <http://www.dpandlpowerauctions.com>. It contains relevant data, the schedule and key dates for participating in the auction process, frequently asked questions, and other information.

Unless noted otherwise, "days" refer to business days and times refer to prevailing Eastern Time. Unless noted otherwise, all capitalized terms are defined in Appendix B to the Communication Protocols, the Glossary, available on the CBP Information Website.

Examples in this document are illustrative only.

These Bidding Rules may be modified from time to time by the Auction Manager in order to: (i) facilitate a more competitive CBP, (ii) make any necessary corrections and/or clarifications, (iii) account for any change in CBP products, (iv) conform to any change in state or federal law or rule, and (v) apply any change deemed necessary at the discretion of the Auction Manager. Such modifications will be carried out in consultation with The Dayton Power and Light Company but without prior consent from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO" or "Commission") or any past, current, or potential bidder and will be posted to the Information Website.

### 1.1 Auction Manager

The Auction Manager is CRA International, Inc. d/b/a Charles River Associates, Inc. The Auction Manager can be contacted by sending an email to [dpandl.auctionmanager@crai.com](mailto:dpandl.auctionmanager@crai.com). The full contact information for the Auction Manager is as follows:

CRA International, Inc.  
200 Clarendon Street, T-9  
Boston, MA 02116-5092  
Phone: 617.425.3365  
Fax: 617.425.6574  
[dpandl.auctionmanager@crai.com](mailto:dpandl.auctionmanager@crai.com)

Attn: Robert Lee Vice President/ Auction Manager

## 2. THE PRODUCTS BEING PROCURED

This section summarizes the common elements of the products to be procured in the auctions. The Information Website provides details about the products to be procured in a specific auction, including the delivery periods, the number of tranches, and the nominal MW size of the tranches.

### 2.1 SSO Load

Standard Service Offer ("SSO") Load will be The Dayton Power and Light Company's aggregate requirements for SSO Service for SSO Customers and it will include distribution losses. For purposes of these Bidding Rules, an "SSO Customer" is a retail customer of The Dayton Power and Light Company taking Standard Service Offer.

SSO Load will exclude the requirements of customers served by Competitive Retail Electric Service suppliers ("CRES Suppliers"). CRES Suppliers are certified by the PUCO and serve shopping customers.

SSO Load will also ~~exclude~~include the requirements of customers served via the Percentage of Income Payment Plan ("PIPP Customers") ~~unless or until Ohio Development Services Agency (ODSA) initiates and accepts a PIPP aggregation effort~~. For purposes of the CBP auctions, a PIPP customer is defined as any customer who is a PIPP customer as of June 1, 2017 and any customer who thereafter is enrolled in the PIPP program.

SSO Load will include the requirements of any Unique Arrangement Customers of The Dayton Power and Light Company who are served under special contracts.

### 2.2 Full Requirements Service

The auctions are designed to procure all elements of full requirements service for SSO Customers of The Dayton Power and Light Company. Winning bidders will assume all responsibilities of a Load Serving Entity ("LSE") and will be responsible for supplying all obligations associated with full requirements service. Full requirements service includes energy, capacity, ~~Ohio renewable energy requirements~~, market-based transmission service and market-based transmission ancillaries and any other LSE service or other service as may be required by PJM to serve the SSO Load of The Dayton Power and Light Company.

SSO Load may decrease during the Delivery Period due to customers who switch service to a Competitive Retail Electric Service supplier (CRES) and SSO Load may increase during the Delivery Period due to customers who had previously switched service to a CRES supplier but have chosen to return to SSO. Because each tranche reflects a percentage of DP&L's SSO customer load, a Winning Bidder may experience either increased or decreased supply responsibilities between the start of the Delivery Period and the end of the Delivery Period.

The Dayton Power and Light Company will provide distribution services and will be responsible for Network Integrated Transmission Services ("NITS") charges and for other non-market-based FERC approved transmission charges for shopping and non-shopping load.

Full requirements service and the LSE obligations of winning bidders are defined in the Master SSO Supply Agreement.

## **2.3 Tranches**

SSO Load will be divided into identical units called tranches, each representing an equivalent percentage of SSO Load. Each tranche represents one percent (1%) of the actual hourly energy required for SSO Load for the applicable delivery period as well as one percent (1%) of the PJM capacity requirement for the applicable delivery period.

The number of tranches intended to be procured for each product in the auction is referred to as the "tranche target" for that product. The Auction Manager may reduce the tranche target(s) prior to the auction if indications of interest in the auction are such that doing so is required to promote more competitive bidding.

## **3. PRICES PAID TO SSO SUPPLIERS**

The payment to SSO Suppliers for tranches won will be equal to the auction clearing prices. There will be no seasonal adjustments to prices.

## **4. PRIOR TO THE START OF BIDDING**

### **4.1 Information Provided to Bidders**

The Dayton Power and Light Company will make available certain information to suppliers in advance of qualification. This information will be posted on the Information Website.

#### **4.1.1 Load Data**

The Dayton Power and Light Company will provide:

- Load data for a historical three-year period.
- Historical hourly load data for total retail load and SSO Load.
- Historical switching statistics and historical load profiles.
- Customer counts, peak demand and NSPL for eligible and SSO load by customer class
- PIPP customer counts and PIPP customers as % of total customers

- ~~DP&L Renewable Energy Credit (RECs) targets consistent with the renewable energy requirements contained in ORC §4928.64~~

#### 4.1.2 Minimum and Maximum Starting Prices

The Auction Manager will announce a minimum starting price and a maximum starting price for each product in the auction. The minimum and maximum starting prices establish the range for the possible round 1 prices for the auction.

#### 4.1.3 Tranche Size, Tranche Targets

No later than eight (8) days prior to the Part 1 Application Due Date, the Auction Manager will announce for each product in the auction:

- The tranche target or the number of tranches being procured.
- The size (%) and MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

No later than four (4) days prior to the Part 2 Application Due Date, the Auction Manager will announce:

- Any update to the MW-measure of the tranches in the auction.

## 4.2 Qualification Process

There are two parts to the application process. In Part 1, prospective bidders apply to become Qualified Bidders. In Part 2, each Qualified Bidder provides certifications and its indicative offer and pre-bid security in order to become a Registered Bidder.

There will be at least one CBP auction per year and in some cases there may be more than one. The first auction will be scheduled as soon as practical upon approval of the DP&L Electric Security Plan ("ESP").

All bidders in DP&L CBP auctions must submit a Part 1 Application. In certain cases, however, bidders may be allowed to use a completed Part 1 Application from a prior CBP auction. For example, if two auctions for products with the same delivery period take place within a twelve month period, Qualified Bidders for the first auction in the period may not need to complete a new Part 1 Application for the subsequent auction in the period. The Qualified Bidder would still need to complete the Part 2 Application for the second auction in the period, even if the Qualified Bidder completed a Part 2 Application for the first auction in the period. Additionally, if a Qualified Bidder is using a completed Part 1 Application from a prior CBP, the Qualified Bidder may be required to update their financial or credit information in the Part 1 Application.

If a prospective bidder for the second auction within a twelve month period was not a Qualified Bidder for the first auction in the period, then the prospective bidder must complete the Part 1 Application to become a Qualified Bidder for the auction.

All prospective bidders for the first auction in a twelve month period must complete a Part 1 Application to become a Qualified Bidder for that auction, even if they were Qualified Bidders in prior DP&L CBP auctions.

A prospective bidder is obligated to inform the Auction Manager of any change in its status related to the information the prospective bidder previously provided in its Part 1 Application or its Part 2 Application.

### 4.2.1 Part 1 Application: Certifications and Other Qualified Bidder Requirements

In the Part 1 Application process, prospective bidders will be required to:

- Submit an application from a person with the power to bind the bidder.
- Agree to comply with all rules of the auction.
- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will execute the Master SSO Supply Agreement with The Dayton Power and Light Company within three (3) business days following the close of the auction.
- Show either that they are a PJM market participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM, or that there exist no impediments to them becoming a PJM market participant and Load Serving Entity in PJM by the start of the applicable delivery period.



- Agree that if they become winning bidders, they will comply with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the Master SSO Supply Agreement.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders or confidential information that may be obtained during the bidding process about Qualified Bidders.
- Certify that if they qualify to participate, they will not substitute another entity in their place, transfer their rights to another entity, or otherwise assign their status as Qualified Bidders to another entity.
- If the applicant would like to propose changes to the Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit or the Form of SSO Supplier Letter of Credit, submit those changes in an electronic, red-lined version.
- Part 1 Applications must be submitted to the Auction Manager no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 1 Application Due Date. Prospective bidders will be notified by the Auction Manager no later than three (3) days after the Part 1 Application Due Date whether they succeeded in becoming a Qualified Bidder.

A prospective bidder that has qualified during the Part 1 Application process becomes a Qualified Bidder. The Auction Manager will send a list of all Qualified Bidders to relevant parties that have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Qualified Bidders. The relevant parties that will receive this list of Qualified Bidders are as follows:

- Each Qualified Bidder;
- Other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, including representatives from The Dayton Power and Light Company, PUCO Staff, and any advisor ("PUCO Consultant") that PUCO Staff may have retained for this purpose.

All parties receiving a list of Qualified Bidders will be subject to the confidentiality requirements as specified below and in the Communications Protocols.

#### 4.2.2 Part 2 Application: Certifications, Indicative Offer, and Pre-Bid Security

For each auction, Qualified Bidders must successfully complete the Part 2 Application process in order to become a Registered Bidder that can bid in the auction. Only Qualified Bidders may submit a Part 2 Application.

Part 2 Applications must be submitted to the Auction Manager no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 2 Application Due Date. Qualified Bidders will be notified by the Auction Manager whether they succeeded in the Part 2 Application process no later than three (3) days after the Part 2 Application Due Date.

##### Certifications

In the Part 2 Application, each Qualified Bidder will make a number of certifications to ensure the confidentiality of information regarding the auction, and in regards to associations with other Qualified

Bidders to ensure that they are participating independently of other Qualified Bidders. More details on the certifications can be found in the section, "Confidential Information, Certifications, and Sanctions," later in this document.

The competitiveness of the auction and the ability of the auction to produce competitive prices may be harmed by the coordinated or collusive behavior that associations among bidders may facilitate. As the Auction Manager relies on a number of factors to assess and promote competitive bidding, including the number of independent competitors, providing inaccurate information or insufficient disclosure of associations in the Part 2 Application is prohibited. More details on rules and protocols for participation by associated bidders in The Dayton Power and Light Company's CBP auctions are included as an Appendix to these Bidding Rules.

### Indicative Offer

With its Part 2 Application, a Qualified Bidder will be required to submit an indicative offer and to post pre-bid security sufficient for this indicative offer. A Qualified Bidder's indicative offer specifies two (2) numbers of tranches for each product in the auction. For each product, the first number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the minimum starting price for the product and the second number represents the number of tranches that the Qualified Bidder is willing to serve at the maximum starting price for the product. For each product, the number of tranches specified in the indicative offer at the minimum starting price cannot exceed the number of tranches specified at the maximum starting price.

Indicative offers are important in two respects. First, the Auction Manager may use the indicative offers to inform the setting of the starting price for each product (i.e., round 1 announced price). Second, the total number of tranches indicated by the Qualified Bidder at the maximum starting prices is used to determine the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility (i.e., the maximum total number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid across all products in round 1 of the auction): the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility is set to the sum of the number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer. During the auction, bidders are free to switch their tranches among products in response to changes in announced prices (subject to any bidding restrictions). However, a bidder will never be able to bid a total number of tranches across all products that exceeds the bidder's initial eligibility. Thus, the number of tranches for each product at the maximum starting prices in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer does not limit the number of tranches the Qualified Bidder can bid on a particular product, but the total number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the indicative offer must be equal to the Qualified Bidder's desired initial eligibility across all products.

Any restriction on the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility also will restrict the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer commensurately. A Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility is restricted to be no higher than the lesser of the following: (a) a credit-based tranche cap and (b) any applicable load cap.

### Restrictions on the Indicative Offer: Credit-Based Tranche Cap

A Qualified Bidder may have a credit-based tranche cap that limits the Qualified Bidder's initial eligibility. The total number of tranches at the maximum starting prices across all products in the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer must not exceed the Qualified Bidder's credit-based tranche cap. This credit-based

tranche cap is based on the credit rating of the Qualified Bidder or its Guarantor. A Qualified Bidder's credit-based tranche cap is determined as shown in in Table 1:

**Table 1. Credit-Based Tranche Cap**

Credit Rating of Qualified Bidder or Guarantor			Credit-Based Tranche Cap
S&P	Moody's	Fitch	
BB and above	Ba2 and above	BB and above	Unlimited up to auction's tranche target
BB-	Ba3	BB-	8 tranches
Below BB-	Below Ba3	Below BB-	5 tranches
If not rated by any of those rating agencies			5 tranches

Note that the parameters in the table above may vary by auction and over time, at the sole discretion of the Dayton Power and Light Company.

To be assigned a credit-based tranche cap greater than the minimum credit-based tranche cap, the Qualified Bidder or its Guarantor must:

- Be rated by at least one of the following rating agencies: Standard & Poor's Rating Services ("S&P"), Moody's Investors Service, Inc. ("Moody's"), or Fitch, Inc. ("Fitch"), and
- Have a senior unsecured debt rating (or, if unavailable, corporate or issuer rating).

If the Qualified Bidder or Guarantor is rated by only one rating agency, that rating will be used. If the Qualified Bidder or Guarantor is rated by only two rating agencies, and the ratings differ, the higher rating will be used. If the Qualified Bidder or Guarantor is rated by the three rating agencies, and the ratings differ, the higher of the ratings will be used.

If a Qualified Bidder is not rated by any of the rating agencies, the Qualified Bidder's credit-based tranche cap will be the minimum credit-based tranche cap as shown in Table 1.

The credit-based tranche cap is in effect only during the bidding process. After the Master SSO Supply Agreement has been executed by a winning bidder, the credit-based tranche cap no longer will be in effect and the SSO Supplier will be required to meet the credit terms in accordance with the Master SSO Supply Agreement.

### Restrictions on the Indicative Offer: Load Cap:

In addition to any credit-based tranche cap, a Qualified Bidder will be subject to a load cap that limits the number of tranches the bidder can bid on and win. The load cap will be 80 percent on an aggregated load basis across all auction products for each auction date such that no bidder may bid on and win more tranches than the load cap. The load cap will be implemented by ensuring that each bidder's initial eligibility does not exceed the load cap in an auction.

### Pre-Bid Security

Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security sufficient for its indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Each Qualified Bidder must post pre-bid security in an amount specified in the Part 2 Application for all products included in the bidder's indicative offer at the maximum starting prices. Either cash (electronic wire transfer) or a Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit will be accepted as pre-bid security. Some bidders may be subject to additional credit requirements or may be required to submit a letter of intent from a Guarantor or a letter of reference from a bank. The standard form of the Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit and other security documents will be posted to the Information Website.

If a draft Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit, letter of intent, letter of reference, or any alternate security submitted by the prospective bidder with the Part 1 Application does not conform to the standard form, the prospective bidder shall indicate clearly any and all modifications in electronic, redlined format from the standard form. Proposed modifications must be received by the Auction Manager no later than 12:00 p.m. noon prevailing Eastern Time on the Part 1 Application Due Date. The Dayton Power and Light Company will assess, in their sole and exclusive discretion, whether such modifications are acceptable. Note that the Dayton Power and Light Company will not accept any modifications to the Form of Guaranty. The prospective bidder, in its Part 2 Application, must provide either cash or the required executed credit documents that either use the standard form or incorporate only those modifications to the standard form accepted by The Dayton Power and Light Company upon review of the bidder's Part 1 Application.

The following is an example calculation of the pre-bid security.

**Example 1. Pre-Bid Security**

A Qualified Bidder submits an indicative offer of 5 tranches for Product 1 at the minimum starting price and 10 tranches for Product 1 at the maximum starting price, 3 tranches for Product 2 at the minimum starting price and 6 tranches for Product 2 at the maximum starting price, and 2 tranches for Product 3 at the minimum starting price and 4 tranches for Product 3 at the maximum starting price. Suppose the pre-bid security amount specified in the Part 2 Application is \$250,000 per tranche. The Qualified Bidder must submit with this indicative offer of 20 tranches at the maximum starting prices cash or a Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit of \$250,000 per tranche. The Qualified Bidder thus posts cash or a Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit of \$5 million (20 tranches X \$250,000 per tranche).

Depending on whether the Qualified Bidder is relying on its own financial standing or on that of a Guarantor, and depending on the results of the creditworthiness assessment at the time of the Part 1 Application, the Qualified Bidder may be required additionally to submit a letter of intent to provide a guaranty from its Guarantor or to provide a letter of reference from its bank. Any such additional requirements would be communicated to the Qualified Bidder at the time of qualification during the Part 1 Application process.

For a Part 2 Application to be accepted, it must be complete, and it must include the Qualified Bidder's indicative offer, pre-bid security (either a Pre-Bid Security Letter of Credit or cash), and additional security (if required). After its Part 2 Application is accepted, a Qualified Bidder becomes a Registered Bidder. The Auction Manager will send each Registered Bidder a summary of its indicative offer, pre-bid security amount, and the Registered Bidder's initial eligibility.

The Auction Manager also will send simultaneously to each Registered Bidder, and to those other parties as necessary to oversee the proper conduct of the auction, a list of Registered Bidders, and the total initial eligibility aggregated across all Registered Bidders. The list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility will not be released publicly. Qualified Bidders, in their Part 2 Applications, will have undertaken to maintain the confidentiality of the list of Registered Bidders and the total initial eligibility, and to destroy documents including electronic files with this information provided by the Auction Manager within five (5) days following the conclusion of the auction, as explained further in the Part 2 Application.

Pre-bid security and additional security (if required) will remain in full force, at a minimum, until five (5) calendar days after the conclusion of the auction. Subsequently, a bidder's pre-bid security and additional security will be cancelled and returned as follows:

- As soon as practicable if the bidder has won no tranches.
- After the bidder has signed the Master SSO Supply Agreement and has complied with all creditworthiness requirements of the Master SSO Supply Agreement for the tranches that it has won.

The Dayton Power and Light Company can collect on the financial guarantees of bidders that win tranches but that fail to sign the Master SSO Supply Agreement or fail to comply with the creditworthiness requirements immediately following the close of the auction.

### 4.2.3 Sanctions for Failing to Comply with the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications

Sanctions can be imposed on a bidder for failing to disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder, or for failing to abide by any of the certifications that it will have made in its Part 1 and Part 2 Applications. Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, termination of the Master SSO Supply Agreement, loss of all rights to provide supply for The Dayton Power and Light Company to serve any load won by such bidder, forfeiture of financial guarantees and other fees posted or paid, prosecution under applicable state and federal laws, debarment from participation in future competitive bidding processes, and other sanctions that may be appropriate. For any failure to disclose information or for any violation of the certifications, the Auction Manager will make a recommendation on a possible sanction.

### 4.3 Starting Prices (Round 1 Prices)

No later than three (3) days before bidding starts for an auction, the Auction Manager will inform all Registered Bidders of the starting price for each product in the auction, which are the announced prices that will be in effect for round 1. For each product, the starting price will be no higher than the maximum starting price and no lower than the minimum starting price for the product. The Auction Manager will set the starting prices.

### 4.4 Extraordinary Events

The Auction Manager, in consultation with The Dayton Power and Light Company, may determine that, due to extraordinary events, the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices require revision. In this event, the schedule for the auction process also may be revised. If the indicative offers have already been received, the Auction Manager will request that the Registered Bidders (or the Qualified Bidders if the Part 2 Application process had not been completed) revise their indicative offers on the basis of the revised minimum starting prices and the revised maximum starting prices.

For such a revision to be necessary, an extraordinary event must occur between the time at which the minimum starting prices and the maximum starting prices are announced and the day on which bidding starts. An extraordinary event must be agreed to by The Dayton Power and Light Company and the Auction Manager. Such events could include, but are not limited to, the advent of war, the disruption of a major supply source for potentially extended periods, or other events that could significantly affect the cost of supply.

If an extraordinary event occurs during that time, the Auction Manager in consultation with The Dayton Power and Light Company will determine revised minimum starting prices and revised maximum starting prices. New indicative offers based on these prices will be required from bidders. To the extent practicable, the determination of new minimum and maximum starting prices, the submission of new indicative offers, and if necessary the announcement of new starting prices, will be carried out so as to afford bidders sufficient time. If an extraordinary event occurs during that time that causes a possible change in the schedule, the Auction Manager in consultation with The Dayton Power and Light Company will determine a revised schedule.

## **5. BIDDING FORMAT FOR AUCTIONS OF MULTIPLE PRODUCTS**

In order to participate in the auction, bidders must have been successful in the Part 1 Application process and the Part 2 Application process. Only Registered Bidders are permitted to participate in the auction. Registered Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Auction Manager's secure Bidding Website.

### **5.1 Descending-Price Clock Format**

The auction format is a simultaneous, multiple-round, descending-price clock format for "N" rounds. The number of rounds "N" for the auction is not pre-determined. Instead, it is determined by the closing rule for the auction. All products are bid on simultaneously in the auction during bidding rounds. Prices are announced for the products prior to each bidding round, and during a bidding round, a bidder submits for each product the number of tranches it would supply at the product's announced price. If the total number of tranches bid on a product exceeds the product's tranche target — i.e., the product is over-subscribed — the announced price for the product will be reduced for the next round. Announced prices will tend to decline round by round until the number of tranches bid falls sufficiently so that no product is over-subscribed, there is no excess supply, and the auction closes.

An important rule is that a bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bids on a product if the product's announced price does not fall from one round to the next, the bidder can only maintain or increase the number of tranches it bids on the product (subject to other rules).

#### **5.1.1 Rounds**

Each bidding round has a specified start time and a specified end time. These start and end times are enforced by the Bidding Website. Prior to the start of the auction, the initial schedule of rounds will be available on the Bidding Website. As the auction progresses, the Auction Manager will keep bidders informed of the start and end times of subsequent rounds through the Bidding Website. The Auction Manager retains the option of pausing a round, delaying the start or end of a round, or otherwise adjusting the round times. The Auction Manager will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if it exercises this discretion to change the start time or end time of a round.

Bidders submit bids only during a round. When a round ends, the bids submitted during that round are processed and results of that round are reported to all bidders as explained in the section "Reporting Round Results" below. Each bidder then prepares to submit a bid for the next round if the auction remains open.

#### **5.1.2 The Announced Prices and a Bid**

Prior to the start of each round, the Auction Manager announces the price that will be in effect for each product for the round. The announced prices are specified in dollars per MWh or \$/MWh. The price announced by the Auction Manager for a product applies to all of the product's tranches. Each bidder decides how many tranches it is willing and able to supply for each product at the product's announced price. A bid by a bidder is, for each product, the number of tranches that the bidder is willing to supply at that announced price for the product. All bids are irrevocable and binding upon the bidders.

At sufficiently high announced prices there will be excess supply for a product causing it to be over-subscribed; that is, the number of tranches bid on the product will exceed the product's tranche target. Excess supply for a product is measured as the total number of tranches bid across all bidders on the product in the round minus the product's tranche target.

### 5.1.3 Reservation Prices and Starting Prices

There are reservation prices for the auction. The reservation price for a product is the price above which tranches for the product will not be purchased. If, at the conclusion of the auction, the reservation price for a product has not been met, no tranches for that product will be awarded. At the conclusion of the auction, the Auction Manager will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if the reservation price for a product has not been met.

Starting prices for the auction are determined after reservation prices are determined. The starting price for a product will be no lower than the reservation price for the product. The starting price may be the same as or higher than the reservation price for the product. The Auction Manager will not announce the reservation prices to bidders.

### 5.1.4 Restrictions on What a Bidder Can Bid

The total number of tranches a bidder bids across all products in a round cannot exceed the bidder's eligibility for that round. That is, a bidder's eligibility to bid in a round is the maximum number of tranches it is allowed to bid across all products in that round. A bidder's eligibility for a round simply is the number of tranches the bidder bid across all products in the preceding round. Thus, a bidder cannot increase its eligibility from round to round; its eligibility can only stay the same or decrease from round to round.

A bidder is not allowed to bid more tranches on a product in a round than the product's tranche target.

A bidder is not allowed to bid a number of tranches that would violate either its credit-based tranche limit or any applicable load cap.

If the announced price for a product has been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder can reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

If the announced price for a product has not been reduced from one round to the next round, the bidder cannot reduce the number of tranches it bid on that product.

Subject to the rules above, in each round a bidder is free to bid its tranches of eligibility across products however it would like to. Thus, subject to the rules above, bidders are free to reduce the tranches they bid and/or to switch tranches across products from round to round in response to changes in the announced prices for the products.

As discussed above, a bidder's initial eligibility is its eligibility for round 1 of the auction and is determined by the total number of tranches across products at the maximum starting prices in the bidder's indicative offer. During the course of the auction, the bidder's eligibility will decline or remain unchanged depending on the total number of tranches bid by the bidder across all products in each round of the auction.



If a bidder's eligibility falls to zero tranches, it will not be allowed to bid in any more rounds of the auction.

### 5.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder

Because a bidder may decide to change a bid it submitted previously within the current open round, a bidder is allowed to make multiple bid submissions in a round as long as the round remains open for bidding, with each new confirmed bid fully replacing any prior bids it submitted in the round. If a bidder submits multiple bids in a round, the only bid considered in the round for that bidder is the last confirmed bid it submitted in the round.

### 5.1.6 Default Bid

After the end of a round, a default bid is submitted automatically on behalf of a bidder if the bidder:

- Entered the round with positive eligibility, and
- Did not submit a confirmed bid in the round.

If the announced price for a product declined from the prior round, then zero tranches will be the default bid for that product.

If the announced price for a product did not decline from the prior round, then the number of tranches that the bidder bid on the product in the prior round as determined by the end-of-round ("EOR") procedure following the prior round will be the default bid for the product.

Each bidder is solely responsible for ensuring it submits a confirmed bid prior to the end of the round in order to avoid a default bid of being submitted on the bidder's behalf.

### 5.1.7 The EOR Procedure

At the end of each round, the EOR procedure is used to process the confirmed bids submitted during the round. The EOR procedure includes the following steps.

- (a) The supply for each product is measured by summing up — across the confirmed bids for all bidders — the number of tranches bid for each product.
- (b) The subscription level for each product is measured by comparing the supply for the product to the tranche target for the product. A product is over-subscribed, subscribed, or under-subscribed if supply (i.e., the number of tranches bid) is greater than, equal to, or less than the product's tranche target, respectively.
- (c) If a product has become under-subscribed in a round after being over-subscribed or subscribed in the preceding round, then tranches will be rolled back to the point that the product is subscribed. That is, at least some of the tranches that were bid on the product in the preceding round but were not bid on the product in this round will be deemed to still be bid on the product. The price at which a rolled-back tranche is deemed to have been bid is the announced price at which the bidder had bid the tranche. There is a priority for selecting tranches to roll back: tranches that otherwise would no longer be bid on any product in the auction and therefore would be reductions in bidders' eligibilities are rolled back first (referred to as "eligibility reduction tranches"), and then if needed, tranches that were switched from being bid on the product to being bid on another product are selected next for rollbacks (referred to as "switched tranches"). Eligibility reduction tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. Likewise, switched tranches are selected for rollback proportionally tranche by tranche, not bidder by bidder. More precisely, because integer tranches are needed, the actual selection mechanism uses a random number generator to select rollbacks tranche by tranche (first for eligibility reduction tranches and then for switched tranches), but on average the selection process results in proportional rollbacks (with priority given to rolling back eligibility reduction tranches first and then switched tranches second). All tranches that are rolled back maintain their eligibility for the bidder. Any bidder subjected to a rollback will be notified through the Bidding Website that a rollback has taken place and will be informed about the number of tranches deemed bid on each product and the price at which those tranches have been deemed bid.

For example, suppose a bidder bids five tranches on a product and no tranches on other products in round 8, and the price for that product is reduced for round 9 and the bidder bids only 1 tranche on the product and no tranches on other products for round 9. Absent any EOR rollbacks following round 9, the bidder's eligibility would fall from 5 tranches to 1 tranche. But during the EOR procedure, suppose two of the bidder's 4 "eligibility reduction tranches" are rolled back on the product, so after the EOR procedure the bidder is deemed to have bid 3 tranches on the product — one at the announced price of the round just ended and two at the announced price of the preceding round — and therefore the bidder is deemed to have 3 tranches of eligibility for round 10.

- (d) "Free eligibility tranches" are determined as follows. A product's "bid stack" is a list of the tranches currently deemed bid on the product and the price at which each tranche was bid for the product. Because of rollbacks, a product's bid stack could have tranches bid at two different prices: some tranches bid at the earlier, higher announced price and some tranches bid at the current, lower announced price. Any new tranche bid on such a product necessarily will be bid at the current, lower announced price. This new tranche will displace a tranche in the product's bid stack at the earlier, higher announced price. The displaced tranche becomes a "free eligibility tranche". The free eligibility tranche counts as eligibility for the bidder and the bidder can bid the tranche on any product next round, or the bidder can choose not to bid the tranche at all. But if the bidder does not bid the free eligibility tranche next round, the tranche will be withdrawn from the auction permanently and will reduce the bidder's eligibility by one tranche after the next round.
- (e) In some cases, the Auction Manager may reduce the tranche targets. The criteria that could lead to such a reduction will be determined prior to the auction but will not be announced to bidders. Once certain pre-specified criteria related to excess supply and related to the reservation price have been met, the discretion to reduce a product's tranche target because of insufficient supply will be eliminated. Thus, any tranche target reduction would more likely occur in the earlier rounds of the auction. If the Auction Manager reduces the tranche target for a product, bidders will be informed of the revised tranche target. Any bidder that would otherwise have eligibility exceeding the new tranche targets will have its eligibility reduced so as not to exceed the new tranche targets.
- (f) A determination is made as to whether the auction has concluded. The auction concludes if either case (1) or case (2) holds as follows:
- (1) If no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches, then the auction has concluded. Note that it is possible for the auction to continue with no reductions in announced prices: if no product is over-subscribed there will be no reductions in announced prices but if there are free eligibility tranches (which "expire" after one round), the auction will remain open for one more round (subject to case (2) described next), allowing bidders with free eligibility to bid those tranches.
  - (2) If this is the Nth consecutive round in which no product is over-subscribed, and the number of tranches of free eligibility across all bidders as a percentage of the sum of the tranche targets across all products is less than or equal to X percent, then the auction has concluded. The parameter values for N and X will be determined before the auction and disclosed to bidders. The likelihood that this case (2) would occur in a particular auction is expected to be low.
- (g) If the auction has concluded, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices are determined as described below.
- (h) If the auction has not concluded, then each bidder's eligibility is determined for the next round and the price decrement (if any) is determined for each product for the next round.

### 5.1.8 Price Decrements

The announced prices will decrease round by round by a price decrement for over-subscribed products. Pre-specified price guidelines are used to determine the price decrements. Generally the price decrement for a product will be larger during the earlier rounds in the auction and when the excess supply for the product is greater. The price decrement is expected to be between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the announced price for the most recently completed round.

The Auction Manager reserves the right to override the price decrement guidelines. The exercise of that right is expected to occur rarely and only if doing so is believed to facilitate timely progression of the bidding process.

## 5.2 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices

At the close of the auction, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices will be determined as follows.

As a result of the EOR procedure as described above, there are two possible scenarios for a product at the close of the auction.

### 5.2.1 Bid Stack for a Product has All Tranches at the Same Price

In this scenario, there are no rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: all tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price, including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure. That announced price is the product's clearing price, and all tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product. Note that this scenario includes the case in which a product was over-subscribed at some point in the auction and later became subscribed, as well as the case in which a product was always under-subscribed in the auction (i.e., it was never subscribed or over-subscribed in the auction).

### 5.2.2 Bid Stack for a Product has Tranches at Two Different Prices

In this scenario, there are rolled-back tranches in the product's bid stack: some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the last announced price (including any tranches bid on the product in the last round of the auction as determined by the EOR procedure), and some tranches in the bid stack were bid at the next most recent announced price. In this case, the product's clearing price is the next most recent announced price — which necessarily is higher than the last announced price for the product. All tranches in the product's bid stack are winning tranches if the clearing price satisfies the product's reservation price. Bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders for those tranches, and all bidders with winning tranches on a product are paid the same price — i.e., the clearing price — for each winning tranche on the product.

## 5.3 Example of Round by Round Bidding

Appendix A provides an illustrative example of round by round bidding.

## 5.4 Reporting Round Results

During a round, a bidder can see the current status of the auction and the status of the current round, including the announced price for each product as well as the bidder's own bidding status. A bidder will not see information about other bidders.

Between rounds the Bidding Website will report the results for the most recently completed round. Results for all prior rounds also will be accessible. The round results for each completed round in the auction will show:

- The announced price for each product and a range of total supply across all bidders and all products (that is, a range that includes the total number of tranches bid). The range of total supply will be defined by two different integers. Actual total supply will not be reported but will be at least as high as the lower of the two integers and no higher than the higher of the two integers. There is an exception to reporting total supply as a range of two integers: if and when total supply has declined below a pre-determined level, total supply will be reported simply as being below that level. The reporting ranges will be made available to bidders in advance of each auction.
- For each bidder, that bidder's bid for the round — i.e., the number of tranches bid on each product — and the bidder's eligibility for the next round. (Each bidder does not see information about other bidders.)
- The announced price for each product for the next round if the auction will continue with the next round.

## 5.5 Frequency of Rounds

The early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than later rounds. The duration of a bidding round will be at least five (5) minutes.

The time between early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than for later rounds. The time between bidding rounds will be at least five (5) minutes.

The schedule of rounds and any changes to the schedule will be made available to bidders through the Bidding Website.

## 5.6 Auction Pause Declared by Auction Manager

At any time during the auction, the Auction Manager may decide to pause the auction. This is not expected to happen often, and it may not happen at all. If the Auction Manager pauses the auction or changes the round schedule in any way, bidders will be notified.

## **6. BIDDING FORMAT FOR AUCTIONS OF A SINGLE PRODUCT**

In order to participate in the auction, bidders must have been successful in the Part 1 Application process and the Part 2 Application process. Only Registered Bidders are permitted to participate in the auction. Registered Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Auction Manager's secure Bidding Website.

The auction format is a multiple-round descending-price clock format for "N" rounds (N is not pre-determined, as discussed below) possibly followed by a sealed-bid round. The descending-price clock rounds are referred to as the "clock phase." If there is a round following the last clock round, it is referred to as the "sealed-bid round."

The number of rounds for the clock phase is not pre-determined. Instead, it is determined by a rule called "the transition rule," which determines the last round of bidding in the clock phase.

The clock phase, the transition rule, and the sealed-bid round are described next.

### **6.1 Clock Phase**

The description in this section applies to the clock phase of the auction. In a descending-price clock bidding format, the Auction Manager announces a price prior to the start of each bidding round and each bidder bids the quantity it would supply at that price. The rounds continue with the price declining each round, causing the total supply bid to fall.

An important rule is that a bidder cannot increase the number of tranches it bids round to round as the price falls, it can only maintain or reduce the number of tranches it bids.

#### **6.1.1 Rounds**

The clock phase is conducted with rounds of bidding. Each bidding round has a specified start time and a specified end time. These start and end times are enforced by the Bidding Website. Prior to the start of the auction, the initial schedule of rounds will be available on the Bidding Website. As the auction progresses, the Auction Manager will keep bidders informed of the start and end times of subsequent rounds through the Bidding Website. The Auction Manager retains the option of pausing a round, delaying the start or end of a round, or otherwise adjusting the round times. The Auction Manager will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if it exercises this discretion to change the start time or end time of a round.

Bidders submit bids only during a round. When a round ends, the bids submitted during that round are processed and results of that round are reported to all bidders as explained in the section "Reporting Round Results" below. Each bidder then prepares to submit a bid for the next round if the auction remains open.

### 6.1.2 The Announced Price and a Bid

Prior to the start of each round, the Auction Manager announces the price that will be in effect for the round. The announced price is specified in dollars per MWh or \$/MWh. The price announced by the Auction Manager applies to all the tranches. Each bidder decides how many tranches it is willing and able to supply at the announced price. A bid is the number of tranches the bidder is willing to supply at that announced price. All bids are irrevocable and binding upon the bidders.

The announced price will decrease round by round by a price decrement.

At sufficiently high announced prices there will be excess supply for the tranches being procured in the auction. Excess supply for the tranches in a round is measured as the total number of tranches bid across all bidders in the round minus the tranche target.

### 6.1.3 Reservation Price

There is a reservation price for the auction. The reservation price is the price above which tranches will not be purchased. At the conclusion of the auction, the Auction Manager will inform bidders through the Bidding Website if the reservation price has not been met.

The starting price for the auction is determined after the reservation price is determined. The starting price will be no lower than the reservation price. The starting price may be the same as or higher than the reservation price. The Auction Manager will not announce the reservation price to bidders.

### 6.1.4 A Bidder's Eligibility to Bid

A bidder's eligibility to bid in a round is the maximum number of tranches it is allowed to bid in that round. A bidder's eligibility for a round is the number of tranches the bidder bid in the preceding round. Thus, a bidder cannot increase its eligibility from round to round; its eligibility can only stay the same or decrease from round to round. If a bidder bids zero tranches in a round, it will not be allowed to bid in any more rounds of the clock phase.

As discussed above, a bidder's initial eligibility is its eligibility for round 1 of the auction.

### 6.1.5 Multiple Bids by a Bidder

Because a bidder may decide to change a bid it submitted previously within the current open round, a bidder is allowed to make multiple bid submissions in a round as long as the round remains open for bidding, with each new confirmed bid fully replacing any prior bids it submitted in the round. If a bidder submits multiple bids in a round, the only bid accepted in the round for that bidder is the last confirmed bid it submitted in the round.

### 6.1.6 Default Bid

After the end of a round, a default bid of zero (0) tranches is submitted automatically on behalf of a bidder if the bidder:

- Entered the round with positive eligibility, and
- Did not submit a confirmed bid in the round.

As with any bidder that actively bids zero tranches in a round, a bidder having a default bid of zero tranches submitted and confirmed on its behalf in a round will not be allowed to bid in any more rounds of the clock phase.

Each bidder is solely responsible for ensuring it submits a confirmed bid prior to the end of the round in order to avoid a default bid of being submitted on its behalf.

### 6.1.7 Price Decrements

The announced price will decrease round by round by a price decrement. Pre-specified price guidelines are used to determine the price decrement. Generally the price decrement will be larger for the earlier rounds in the auction and the greater is the excess supply for the tranches. The price decrement is expected to be between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the announced price for the most recently completed round.

The Auction Manager reserves the right to override the price decrement guidelines. The exercise of that right is expected to occur rarely and only if doing so is believed to facilitate timely progression of the bidding process.

### 6.1.8 Frequency of Rounds

The early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than later rounds. The duration of a bidding round will be at least five (5) minutes.

The time between early rounds of bidding may be longer in duration than for later rounds. The time between bidding rounds will be at least five (5) minutes.

The schedule of rounds and any changes to the schedule will be made available to bidders through the Bidding Website.

### 6.1.9 Insufficient Supply for the Tranches

If there is insufficient supply for the tranches to ensure competitive bidding, the Auction Manager will reduce the tranche target. The criteria that could lead to such a reduction will be determined prior to the auction but will not be announced to bidders. Once certain pre-specified criteria related to excess supply and related to the reservation price have been met, the discretion to reduce the tranche target will be eliminated and there will be no reduction in the tranche target. Thus, any exercise of this discretion would be more likely in the earlier rounds of the auction.

If the Auction Manager reduces the tranche target for the auction, bidders will be informed of the revised tranche target. Any bidder that otherwise would have eligibility exceeding the new tranche target will have its eligibility reduced to the new tranche target.



## 6.2 Transition Rule

The rule that determines the last round of bidding in the clock phase is referred to as the transition rule.

The transition rule is that the last round of bidding in the clock phase is the first round of bidding in the clock phase in which excess supply falls to zero or below zero.

- If excess supply is zero, then the auction closes and the winning tranches, winning bidders, and the winning price are determined as described in section 6.4.
- If excess supply is less than zero and only one bidder reduced the number of tranches it bid between the last two rounds of the clock phase, then the auction closes and the winning tranches, winning bidders, and the winning price are determined as described in section 6.4.
- If excess supply is less than zero and two or more bidders reduced the number of tranches they bid between the last two rounds of the clock phase, then a sealed-bid round will be held as described next in section 6.3.

## 6.3 Sealed-Bid Round

The description in this section applies to the sealed-bid round of the auction. As with the clock phase, bidders bidding in the sealed-bid round will submit their bids by accessing the Auction Manager's secure Bidding Website.

If there is a sealed-bid round, it follows the last round of the clock phase. For ease of description, the last round of the clock phase will be referred to as "round N" and the next-to-last round of the clock phase will be referred to as "round N-1", so the sealed-bid round is "round N+1."

Bidders for the sealed-bid round are those bidders that bid at least one tranche in round N-1 and bid fewer tranches in round N. Any such bidder must submit a bid in the sealed-bid round (even if it bid zero tranches in round N). If it fails to submit a bid in the sealed-bid round, a default bid will be submitted on its behalf as described below in the section on default bids.

Only bidders that bid at least one tranche in round N-1 and bid fewer tranches in round N can submit a bid in the sealed-bid round.

### 6.3.1 Allowed Bids

While each round in the clock phase has an announced price, there is no announced price for the sealed-bid round. In the sealed-bid round, a bidder submits a bid by specifying for each tranche it bids the price at which the bidder is committing to supply the tranche. A bid by a bidder is, for each tranche in the bid, an irrevocable binding commitment to supply the tranche at the price it bids for the tranche.

The tranches in the bidder's bid will be treated as a supply schedule. That is, the tranches will be sorted in ascending order by price and the price it bid for the first tranche is the price at which the bidder is committing to supply the first tranche, the price it bid for the second tranche is the price at which it is committing to supply the second tranche, and so on.

The bid that a bidder can submit in the sealed-bid round is restricted as follows.

- The bidder's bid must include each of the tranches that it bid in round N-1 but did not bid in round N (even if it bid zero tranches in round N).
- For each of the tranches that the bidder bid in round N-1 but did not bid in round N, the bidder's bid in the sealed-bid round must specify a price that is no higher than the announced price in effect for round N-1. The bidder can specify a different price for each of the tranches. Alternatively, the bidder can specify the same price for two or more of the tranches.

The units for prices specified in the bidder's bid are \$/MWh. The precision of prices is \$0.01/MWh or one cent per MWh. Prices that are entered with greater precision than \$0.01/MWh will be rounded up to the next \$0.01/MWh.

The following example shows four bidders participating in the clock phase and two of those bidders participating in the sealed-bid round.

**Example 2. Bids in Clock Phase and Allowed Bids in Sealed-Bid Round**

Clock Phase							
Round	Tranche Target	Announced Price (\$/MWh)	Number of Tranches Bid				
			BidderA	BidderB	BidderC	BidderD	Total
1	100	\$75.00	34	55	21	72	182
2	100	\$70.00	30	55	15	50	150
3	100	\$66.00	20	52	10	45	127
4	100	\$62.00	15	48	0	44	107
5	100	\$59.50	0	48	—	42	90

Sealed-Bid Round					
BidderA (must bid 15 tranches)			BidderD (must bid 2 tranches)		
# Tranches Bid	Max. Allowed Price (\$/MWh)	Price Bid (\$/MWh)	# Tranches Bid	Max. Allowed Price (\$/MWh)	Price Bid (\$/MWh)
5	\$62.00	\$62.00	1	\$62.00	\$60.04
8	\$62.00	\$61.40	1	\$62.00	\$59.50
2	\$62.00	\$59.95	—	—	—

In the example above, the clock phase was stopped after round 5 (round N) because it was the first round in which excess supply no longer was positive: in the round only 90 tranches of supply were bid against 100 tranches being procured.

- BidderA must bid 15 tranches in the sealed-bid round because it bid 15 tranches in round 4 and no tranches in round 5. For each of the 15 tranches, BidderA must submit a price in the sealed-bid round that is no higher than the announced price in round 4, or \$62.00/MWh. The bid submitted by BidderA in the sealed-bid round above satisfies that requirement: 5 tranches bid at \$62.00/MWh, 8 tranches bid at \$61.40/MWh, and 2 tranches bid at \$59.95/MWh.
- BidderB does not bid in the sealed-bid round because it bid at least one tranche in round 4 and it did not bid fewer tranches in round 5. BidderB thus wins the 48 tranches it bid in rounds 4 and 5, and the winning price for those 48 tranches is the round 5 announced price, or \$59.50/MWh.

- After round 4 it is known that BidderC can no longer participate in the auction because it bid zero tranches in round 4 and round 4 was not the last round of the clock phase. Thus, BidderC does not bid in the sealed-bid round and will not win any tranches.
- BidderD wins the 42 tranches it bid in round 5, and the winning price for those 42 tranches is the round 5 announced price, or \$59.50/MWh. In addition, BidderD must bid 2 tranches in the sealed-bid round because it bid 2 fewer tranches in round 5 than it bid in round 4. For each of the 2 tranches, BidderD must submit a price in the sealed-bid round that is no higher than the announced price in round 4, or \$62.00/MWh. The bid submitted by BidderD in the sealed-bid round above satisfies that requirement: 1 tranche bid at \$60.04/MWh and 1 tranche bid at \$59.50/MWh.

### 6.3.2 Multiple Bids by a Bidder

As in the clock phase, a bidder is allowed to make multiple bid submissions in the sealed-bid round as long as the round remains open for bidding, with each new confirmed bid fully replacing any prior bids it submitted in the round. If a bidder submits multiple bids in the round, the only bid accepted in the round for that bidder is the last bid confirmed by the bidder in the round. Section 8.1 below discusses the process for confirming a bid.

### 6.3.3 Default Bid

A bidder in the sealed-bid round must submit a confirmed bid for all the tranches that it must bid in the sealed-bid round. If it fails to submit a confirmed bid by the end of the sealed-bid round, a default bid will be submitted on its behalf. This default bid will be as follows:

For each of the tranches the bidder bid in round N-1 but did not bid in round N, the default bid for the bidder in the sealed-bid round will specify a price that is the announced price in effect for round N-1.

After the sealed-bid round the auction closes and the winning tranches, winning bidders, and the winning price are determined as described in section 6.4.

## 6.4 Determination of Winning Tranches, Winning Bidders, and Winning Prices

At the close of the auction, the winning tranches, winning bidders, and winning prices will be determined as follows.

### 6.4.1 Excess Supply = 0 at End of Clock Phase

If the last round of the clock phase had zero excess supply then there is no sealed-bid round. The winning tranches are the tranches bid in the last round of the clock phase, the winning bidders are the bidders who bid those tranches, and the winning price in the auction is the announced price for the last round of the clock phase.

### 6.4.2 Excess Supply $< 0$ at End of Clock Phase with No Sealed-Bid Round

If the last round of the clock phase had excess supply less than zero but only one bidder reduced the number of tranches it bid between the last two rounds of the clock phase, then there is no sealed-bid round. Tranches bid in the last round of the clock phase are winning tranches, bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders, and the winning price for those tranches is the announced price for the last round of the clock phase.

Additional winning tranches total the difference between the tranche target and the total number of tranches bid in the last round of the clock phase (i.e., round N). Those additional winning tranches are awarded to the one bidder who reduced its number of tranches bid between round N-1 and round N. The bidder is awarded the additional winning tranches at the announced price in effect for the next-to-last round of the auction.

### 6.4.3 Excess Supply $< 0$ at End of Clock Phase with Sealed-Bid Round

If the last round of the clock phase had excess supply less than zero and two or more bidders reduced the number of tranches they bid between the last two rounds of the clock phase, then there is a sealed-bid round. Tranches bid in the last round of the clock phase are winning tranches, bidders who bid those tranches are winning bidders, and the winning price for those tranches is the announced price for the last round of the clock phase.

Additional winning tranches are determined as follows.

Random numbers will be assigned to the tranches bid in the sealed-bid round to be used as a tie-breaker, if needed, in case two or more tranches are bid at the same price. The tranches from the bids in the sealed-bid round will be sorted in ascending order by price and then in ascending order by random number. The assignment of random numbers to tranches and the sorting of tranches by price and by random number are done tranche by tranche without regard to bidder.

A winning tranche from the sorted list of tranches is a tranche that satisfies the following condition:

- It is one of the first T tranches that appears in the sorted list of bids, where T is the difference between the tranche target and the number of tranches bid in the last round of the clock phase. The bidder who bid such a winning tranche is the winning bidder for that tranche and the winning price for that tranche is the price the bidder bid for the tranche.

Tranches in the sorted list of bids that do not meet the condition above are not winning tranches.

None, some, or all of the tranches in a bidder's bid in the sealed-bid round may be winning tranches.

In Example 2 above, 17 tranches were bid in the sealed-bid round, and 10 of those tranches are selected as winning tranches. The winning tranches are selected in order of ascending price bid: one tranche bid at price \$59.50/MWh by BidderD, two tranches bid at price \$59.95/MWh by BidderA, one tranche bid at price \$60.04/MWh by BidderD, and six tranches bid at price \$61.40/MWh by BidderA.

## 6.5 Reporting Round Results

During a round, a bidder will see the current status of the auction and the status of the current round (including the announced price for a round in the clock phase) as well as its own bidding status. A bidder will not see information about other bidders.

Between rounds the Bidding Website will report the results for the most recently completed round. Results for all prior rounds also will be accessible. The round results for each completed round in the clock phase will show:

- For the completed round, the announced price and a range of total supply across all bidders (that is, a range that includes the total number of tranches bid). The range of total supply will be defined by two different integers. Actual total supply will not be reported but will be at least as high as the lower of the two integers and no higher than the higher of the two integers. There is an exception to reporting total supply as a range of two integers: if and when total supply has declined in the clock phase below a pre-determined level, total supply will be reported simply as being below that level. This pre-determined level of total supply will not be disclosed.
- For each bidder, that bidder's bid for the round and the bidder's eligibility for the next round (each bidder does not see information about other bidders).
- The announced price for the next round if the clock phase will continue with the next round.

## 6.6 Auction Pause Declared by Auction Manager

At any time during the auction, the Auction Manager may decide to pause the auction. This is not expected to happen often and it may not happen at all. If the Auction Manager pauses the auction or changes the round schedule, bidders will be notified

## **7. AFTER THE AUCTION CLOSES**

### **7.1 Notification of Results**

At the close of the auction, if the Auction Manager determines that the auction did not violate the competitive bidding process rules in such a manner so as to invalidate the auction, the Auction Manager will notify The Dayton Power and Light Company, the PUCO, the PUCO Consultant (if one has been retained), and the bidders as follows.

- The Auction Manager will notify The Dayton Power and Light Company, the PUCO, and the PUCO consultant of the identities of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each winning bidder, and the prices for the tranches won.
- The Auction Manager will notify each winning bidder of how many tranches the bidder has won and at what prices. The Auction Manager also will notify the unsuccessful bidders that they have not won any tranches.

The PUCO may reject the results of the auction, through an Order filed within forty-eight (48) hours of the conclusion of the auction, based upon a post-auction report from the Auction Manager or the PUCO's consultant in which it is determined that the auction violates a specific CBP rule in such a manner so as to invalidate the auction or if the PUCO determines that one or more of the following criteria were not met:

1. The bidding process was oversubscribed based on bidder indicative offers submitted as part of the Part 2 Application, such that the amount of the supply bid upon was greater than the amount of the load bid out.
2. There were four or more bidders who submitted an Indicative Offer.
3. Consistent with the load cap, no bidder won more than 80% of the initial tranche target for the auction.

Otherwise, the Commission shall approve the auction results.

### **7.2 Execution of Master SSO Supply Agreement**

The winning bidders and The Dayton Power and Light Company will execute the Master SSO Supply Agreements no later than three (3) days following the close of the auction once the specific pricing information and load obligations have been inserted upon completion of the auction. Each winning bidder must demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the Master SSO Supply Agreement.

### **7.3 Sanctions for Failure to Execute the Master SSO Supply Agreement**

A winning bidder's financial guaranty posted with its Part 2 Application may be forfeited if the winning bidder does not execute the Master SSO Supply Agreement within three (3) days following the close of the auction, if it fails to demonstrate compliance with the creditworthiness requirements set forth in the Master SSO Supply Agreement, or if it fails to agree to any of the terms of the Master SSO Supply Agreement. If The Dayton Power and Light Company exercises their right to collect on the financial guarantees, then any contractual rights or other entitlements of the winning bidder will terminate immediately without further notice by The Dayton Power and Light Company. In addition, the winning bidder will be liable for damages incurred by The Dayton Power and Light Company, which will be determined in accordance with the terms of the Master SSO Supply Agreement as though the winning bidder were a Defaulting Party to the Master SSO Supply Agreement.

### **7.4 Disclosure of the Auction Results**

The names of the winning bidders, the number of tranches won by each bidder, and the winning prices will remain confidential until released publicly by the PUCO or as required by law. The PUCO may choose to release additional information.

A winning bidder itself may release information regarding the number of tranches it has won, and a non-winning bidder itself may release information only regarding the fact that it participated in the auction, but not before the earliest of:

- (1) A PUCO Order confirming the results of the auction.
- (2) Forty-eight (48) hours after the conclusion of the auction.

The winning bidders and the non-winning bidders otherwise continue to be bound by their certifications as described elsewhere. In particular, no winning bidder and no non-winning bidder itself can reveal the winning prices of the auction prior to these being publicly released by the PUCO.

## **8. USE OF THE BIDDING WEBSITE**

Bidders will bid in the auction by accessing the Auction Manager's secure Bidding Website. An Authorized Representative of a bidder will access the Bidding Website using their own Web browser. The URL address for the Bidding Website, as well as user names and passwords, will be provided to Registered Bidders prior to the start of the auction.

The Bidding Website allows a Registered Bidder to submit and confirm bids, to verify its status, to view results from prior rounds, to view the schedule of rounds, and to view messages from the Auction Manager.



## 8.1 Importance of Confirmed Bids

Submitting a bid on the Bidding Website involves three steps:

- (1) Web page for entry and submission of the bid quantities. The bidder enters its desired bid and then submits the bid in order to proceed to the next step.
- (2) Web page for validation of the bid. The bidder is asked to review the bid it submitted in the first step before proceeding to the confirmation step.
- (3) Web page showing confirmation of the bid. The bidder receives a unique confirmation ID for the bid and the time-stamp at which the bid was recorded by the Bidding Website server.

It is important to note that a bid is not accepted and recorded as an accepted bid until and unless the bidder reaches the third step in which the bid confirmation Web page displays the unique confirmation ID and time-stamp for the bid.

## 8.2 Requirements for Using the Bidding Website

Access to the Bidding Website requires all of the following:

- User name and password provided by the Auction Manager.
- Access to the Internet.
- Compatible Web browser
- Status as a Registered Bidder.

A bidder loses access to the Bidding Website after it no longer is possible to win tranches in the auction.

## 8.3 Messaging

The Bidding Website displays messages from the Auction Manager. These messages from the Auction Manager are displayed for all bidders with access to the Bidding Website.

## 9. BACKUP BIDDING PROCEDURE

In case a bidder has technical difficulties, and as a result is not able to submit a bid via the Bidding Website in a round, a backup bidding procedure will be provided as follows. The bidder uses the Backup Bidding Fax Number to submit its bid via facsimile. It is recommended that the bidder call the Help Desk and inform the operator that it has submitted a bid using the backup bidding procedure. Reasonable efforts will be made to contact the bidder if the backup bid is not received via facsimile in the time expected. Once the backup bid is received via facsimile, a member of the Auction Manager team will attempt to enter the bid on the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder.

Prior to the auction, bidders will be provided with the Backup Bidding Fax Number and with forms to use for faxing a bid using the backup bidding procedure.

Bidders must be aware and understand that there is no guarantee or other assurance that if it submits a bid using the backup bidding procedure that its bid will be submitted and confirmed on its behalf by the Auction Manager team consistent with the intentions of the bidder and in time before the round ends.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website because the round has ended, a default bid will be entered for the bidder as described above in the sections on default bids.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is not accepted and confirmed by the Bidding Website for other reasons (e.g., the number of tranches bid is greater than a bidder's eligibility or violates the bidder's credit-based tranche limit or applicable load cap), the Auction Manager team will use reasonable efforts to inform the bidder that a new bid must be submitted.

If a backup bid submitted by a bidder is confirmed by the Bidding Website, the Auction Manager team will contact the bidder by faxing confirmation of the accepted bid to the bidder.

Bidders use the backup bidding procedure at their own risk. In all cases involving backup bids, the Auction Manager team does not accept any responsibility, obligation, or liability for errors, omissions, timeliness, or otherwise, related to whether a backup bid is entered into and confirmed by the Bidding Website on behalf of the bidder or as intended by the bidder.

## **10. WHO TO CONTACT IN CASE OF PROBLEMS DURING THE AUCTION**

A bidder should contact the Help Desk if it has questions or problems. The phone number for the Help Desk will be provided to bidders prior to the start of the auction.

## **11. CONTINGENCY PLAN TO PROCURE TRANCHES**

### **11.1 If Fewer Tranches than the Tranche Target are Procured in the Auction**

In the event that fewer tranches than a product's tranche target are procured in the auction, The Dayton Power and Light Company will implement a contingency plan for the unfilled tranches as follows.

#### **11.1.1 Unfilled Tranches to be Offered in Next Scheduled Auction**

For any unfilled tranches, if the next scheduled auction takes place no later than 30 calendar days prior to the start of the delivery period for the unfilled tranches, the unfilled tranches will be made available in that auction. If there is no such auction, or if there is such an auction but some of the unfilled tranches remain unfilled after such an auction, then the remaining unfilled tranches will be procured as follows.

### 11.1.2 Unfilled Tranches to be Offered to Current SSO Suppliers

For this purpose, current SSO Suppliers are SSO Suppliers who have won tranches in one of Dayton Power and Light Company's CBP auctions and either are currently supplying SSO load or are under contract to do so in the future. An SSO Supplier will be considered a current SSO Supplier from the conclusion of the DP&L CBP auction in which such supplier won tranches until after its supply obligations terminate under the prevailing Master SSO Supply Agreement. Current SSO Suppliers will be assigned a random number and each unfilled tranche will be offered to current SSO Suppliers in ascending order of random number, subject to any credit-based tranche limits and any applicable load caps for such suppliers. The tranches will be offered to current SSO Suppliers at the clearing price, starting price, or reservation price, whichever is lowest, from the auction in which the tranches were not procured.

### 11.1.3 SSO Supply Requirements to be Met through PJM-Administered Markets

If, after the attempts above to procure unfilled tranches, there remain unfilled tranches, the necessary SSO supply requirements associated with those unfilled tranches will be met through PJM-administered markets at prevailing day-ahead, zonal spot prices, and, unless instructed otherwise by the PUCO, The Dayton Power and Light Company will not enter into hedging transactions to attempt to mitigate the associated price or volume risks to serve these tranches.

## 11.2 If a Winning Bidder Defaults Prior to or During the SSO Delivery Period

In the event a winning bidder defaults prior to or during the delivery of SSO Load requirements, The Dayton Power and Light Company will implement a contingency plan for the open tranches. This contingency plan will follow the same steps as the contingency plan above for unfilled tranches in an auction. That is, the first consideration will be to make the open tranches available in the next scheduled auction if that auction takes place no later than 30 calendar days prior to the start of the delivery period for the open tranches. Next, any remaining open tranches will be offered to current SSO Suppliers as described above.

Finally, the necessary SSO supply requirements associated with any remaining open tranches will be met through PJM-administered markets as described above.

Additional costs incurred by The Dayton Power and Light Company in implementing the contingency plan will be assessed first against the defaulting supplier's credit security, to the extent available.

## 12. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION, CERTIFICATIONS AND SANCTIONS

The Association and Confidential Information rules are described below.

### 12.1 Confidential Information

Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy means information relating to a bidder's bid(s) in the auction, whether in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public likely would have an effect on any of the bids that another bidder would be willing to submit. Confidential Information relative to bidding strategy includes (but is not limited to): a bidder's strategy; a bidder's indicative offer; the quantities that a bidder wishes to supply; the bidder's estimation of the value of a tranche; the bidder's estimation of the risks associated with serving the load for the auction; and a bidder's contractual arrangements for purchasing power to serve such load were the bidder to win tranches in the auction.

Confidential Information regarding the auction means information that is not released publicly by the PUCO, The Dayton Power and Light Company or the Auction Manager and that a bidder acquires as a result of participating in the auction, whether in writing or verbally, which if it were to be made public could impair the integrity of current or future competitive bidding processes, impair the ability of The Dayton Power and Light Company to hold future competitive bidding processes, or harm consumers, bidders or applicants. Confidential Information regarding the auction includes (but is not limited to): the list of Qualified Bidders, the list of Registered Bidders, the initial eligibility, the status of a bidder's participation, and all non-public reports of results and announcements made by the Auction Manager to any or all bidders in this auction.

Confidential Information may not receive continued confidential or protected treatment should: (a) a bidder publically disclose Confidential Information relating solely to that bidder; or (b) public disclosure is required or compelled by the PUCO, a court or otherwise by law. The Auction Manager, the PUCO, and the Dayton Power and Light Company shall not be liable for such public disclosures or, so long as reasonable measures have been taken to keep such information confidential, any other public disclosure of Confidential Information. By participating in this auction process, each bidder acknowledges and agrees to the confidentiality provisions set forth herein, as well as any limitations thereto.

In addition, the bidder agrees the bidder's data and information submitted in this auction process will be disclosed if required by any federal, state or local agency (including, without limitation, the PUCO) or by a court of competent jurisdiction. However, The Dayton Power and Light Company will endeavor to notify the bidder in advance of such disclosure. In any event, neither The Dayton Power and Light Company nor the Auction Manager, nor any of their employees or agents, will be responsible to the bidders or any other party, or liable for any disclosure of such designated materials before, during or subsequent to this auction. Notwithstanding the above, The Dayton Power and Light Company and the Auction Manager reserve the right to use and communicate publicly and/or to third parties any and all information/data submitted as part of this auction process in any proceedings before FERC, the PUCO, and any other regulatory body and the courts, if necessary, without the prior consent/approval of, or notice to, any such bidder.

## **12.2 Certifications and Disclosures to Be Made**

A prospective bidder will be required to make the certifications listed in the Part 1 and Part 2 Applications and to disclose certain information. For example:

A prospective bidder will be required to certify in its Part 1 Application that, should it qualify to participate, it will not disclose information regarding the list of Qualified Bidders.

A prospective bidder will be required to certify that it accepts the terms of the Master SSO Supply Agreement and, should it win tranches, it will sign the applicable Master SSO Supply Agreement and comply with all creditworthiness requirements by the stated deadline.

A prospective bidder will be required in its Part 1 Application to disclose any bidding agreement or any other arrangement in which the prospective bidder may have entered and that is related to its participation in the auction. A prospective bidder that has entered into such an agreement or arrangement must name the entities with which the prospective bidder has entered into a bidding agreement, a joint venture for the purpose of participating in the auction, a bidding consortium, or any other arrangement pertaining to participating in the auction. A bidding consortium is a group of separate businesses or business people joining together to submit joint bids in the auction.

Each Qualified Bidder will be asked to certify in its Part 2 Application that it will undertake steps to appropriately restrict its disclosure of Confidential Information relative to its bidding strategy and Confidential Information regarding the auction.

A Qualified Bidder will be asked to certify in its Part 2 Application that it has not and will not come to any agreement with another Qualified Bidder with respect to bidding in the auction, except as disclosed and approved by the Auction Manager in its Part 1 Application.

Before obtaining sealed documentation necessary to participate in the auction, Registered Bidders will be required to certify that they will continue to maintain the confidentiality of any information that they will have acquired through their participation in the auction.

## **12.3 Actions to be Taken if Certifications Cannot Be Made**

If a bidder cannot make all the certifications, the Auction Manager will decide within five (5) days following the deadline to submit the Part 2 Application on a course of action on a case-by-case basis. To decide on this course of action, the Auction Manager may make additional inquiries and information requests to understand the reason for the inability of the bidder to make the certification.

If Qualified Bidders do not comply with additional information requests by the Auction Manager regarding certifications required in the Part 2 Application, the Auction Manager may reject the application.

## **12.4 Sanctions for Failure to Comply**

Sanctions may be imposed on a bidder for failing to properly disclose information relevant to determining associations, for coordinating with another bidder, for failure to abide by any of the certifications made in its Part 1 Application or Part 2 Application, for releasing Confidential Information or disclosing information during the auction (aside from only specific exceptions provided with respect to entities explicitly named in the Part 1 Application as entities that are part of a bidding agreement or other arrangement), and in general for failing to abide by any of the Communications Protocols.

Such sanctions can include, but are not limited to, any one or more of the following:

- Termination of the Master SSO Supply Agreement;
- The loss of all rights to provide supply for the Dayton Power and Light Company to serve any load won by such bidder;
- The forfeiture of letters of credit, financial guarantees, and other fees posted or paid;
- Action (including prosecution) under applicable state and/or federal laws;
- Attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in any litigation that arises out of the bidder's improper disclosure;
- Debarment from participation in future competitive bidding processes;
- Other sanctions that may be appropriate.

Should such an event occur, the Auction Manager will make a recommendation to The Dayton Power and Light Company regarding sanctions. The imposition of such sanctions will be at the discretion of The Dayton Power and Light Company.

## **13. MISCELLANEOUS**

### **13.1 Warranty on Information**

The information provided for the auction, including but not limited to information provided on the Information Website, has been prepared to assist bidders in evaluating the auction process. It does not purport to contain all the information that may be relevant to a bidder in satisfying its due diligence efforts. Neither The Dayton Power and Light Company nor the Auction Manager make any representation or warranty, expressed or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information, and shall not, either individually or as a corporation, be liable for any representation expressed or implied in the auction process or any omissions from the auction process, or any information provided to a bidder by any other source. A bidder should check the Information Website frequently to ensure it has the latest documentation and information. Neither The Dayton Power and Light Company, nor the Auction Manager, nor any of their representatives, shall be liable to a bidder or any of its representatives for any consequences relating to or arising from the bidder's use of information.

### **13.2 Hold Harmless**

Bidder shall hold The Dayton Power and Light Company and the Auction Manager harmless of and from all damages and costs, including but not limited to legal costs in connection with all claims, expenses, losses, proceedings or investigations that arise in connection with the auction process or the award of a bid pursuant to the auction process.

### **13.3 Bid Submissions Become The Dayton Power and Light Company's Property**

All bids submitted by bidders participating in the auction will become the exclusive property of The Dayton Power and Light Company upon conclusion of the auction process.

### **13.4 Bidder's Acceptance**

Through its participation in the auction process, a bidder acknowledges and accepts all the terms, conditions and requirements of the auction process and the Master SSO Supply Agreement.

### **13.5 Permits, Licenses, Compliance with the Law and Regulatory Approvals**

Bidders shall obtain all licenses and permits and status that may be required by any governmental body, agency or organization necessary to conduct business or to perform hereunder. Bidders' subcontractors, employees, agents and representatives of each in performance hereunder shall comply with all applicable governmental laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, orders and all other governmental requirements.

### **13.6 Auction Intellectual Property**

All title, interests and other intellectual property rights in and to the auction design, the auction format and methodology, the auction software, the source code (including all modifications, enhancements, customization, adaptations and derivative works made by the Auction Manager) and associated documentation, including but not limited to these Bidding Rules, and the screen formats and forms designed by the Auction Manager (the "Auction Software"), are proprietary to the Auction Manager and all rights, title, and interest to the Auction Software remain with the Auction Manager. The Auction Manager grants Qualified Bidders a non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited license to use the Auction Software, solely for use in connection with the auction, subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein, and not for copying, relicensing, sublicensing, distribution or marketing by the Qualified Bidder. No other interest is conveyed to the Qualified Bidder other than the license expressly granted herein. The foregoing use license shall immediately terminate upon disqualification of the Qualified Bidder or upon termination or completion of the auction process. If at any time it is determined in the Auction Manager's sole discretion that the Qualified Bidder is in breach of this section 13.6, the Auction Manager shall be entitled to terminate the Qualified Bidder's access rights to the Auction Software.

Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, and without limiting the Qualified Bidder's other obligations herein, the Qualified Bidder shall not, nor shall it permit any third party to: (i) modify, translate or otherwise create derivative works of the Auction Software; (ii) reverse engineer, decompile, decode, disassemble or translate any Auction Software, or output thereof, or otherwise attempt to reduce to human readable form or derive the source code, protocols or architecture of any Auction Software; (iii) use or study any Auction Software, or output thereof, for the purpose of developing any software that is intended to replace, or that has functions, structure or architecture similar to, such Auction Software, or any part thereof; (iv) publish, or otherwise make available to any third party, any benchmark or other testing information or results concerning the Auction Software; (v) permit any other person who is not authorized to access or use all or any part of the Auction Software or (vi) copy the Auction Software, distribute the Auction Software, remove or obscure any proprietary labeling on or in the Auction Software, create any derivative works based on the Auction Software, or modify the Auction Software, in each case, except to the extent expressly permitted by the Auction Manager in writing.

In using the Auction Software, a Qualified Bidder shall take steps to prevent any virus, worm, built-in or use-driven destruction mechanism, algorithm, or any other similar disabling code, mechanism, software, equipment, or component designated to disable, destroy or adversely affect the Auction Software from being introduced into the systems.



## APPENDIX A — EXAMPLE OF ROUND BY ROUND BIDDING IN AUCTIONS OF MULTIPLE PRODUCTS

The illustrative example below shows for two bidders (BidderA and BidderB) and two products (Product-1 and Product-2) the confirmed bids (pre-EOR) and the post-EOR results for each round. In the example, the auction closes after round 4.

### Round 1

For round 1, the announced prices are \$75.00 and \$82.00 for Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. At those announced prices, BidderA bids 55 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. BidderB bids 80 tranches and 27 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Each product is over-subscribed: 135 tranches were bid on Product-1 which has a tranche target of 100, and 112 tranches were bid on Product-2 which has a tranche target of 100.

The announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$75.00 to \$72.50 for round 2. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$82.00 to \$78.60 for round 2.

BidderA will have eligibility of  $55+85 = 140$  tranches for round 2, and BidderB will have eligibility of  $80+27 = 107$  tranches for round 2.

### Round 2

At the announced prices for round 2, BidderA bids 40 tranches and 85 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 55 to 40 tranches. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB switched 30 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 10 tranches: only 90 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 15 tranches, while BidderB's bid maintained its eligibility. Thus, 10 of the 15 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderA are rolled back on Product-1. Those 10 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-1 at which they were bid in round 1: \$75.00. The announced price for Product-1 will remain at \$72.50 for round 3.

Product-2 is over-subscribed by 42 tranches. The announced price for Product-2 will be reduced from \$78.60 to \$76.10 for round 3.

BidderA will have eligibility of  $50+85 = 135$  tranches for round 3 (including the 10 tranches rolled back on Product-1), and BidderB will have eligibility of  $50+57 = 107$  tranches for round 3.

### Round 3

At the announced prices for round 3, BidderA bids 99 tranches and 36 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA is switching 49 of the tranches bid from Product-2 to Product-1. BidderB bids 50 tranches and 35 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB is reducing its tranches bid on Product-2 from 57 to 35 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is over-subscribed by 49 tranches. Product-2 is under-subscribed by 29 tranches: only 71 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid maintained its eligibility while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 22 tranches. Thus, all 22 of the eligibility reduction tranches of BidderB are rolled back on Product-2. Those 22 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60. Even after rolling back those 22 eligibility reduction tranches of BidderB, Product-2 still is under-subscribed — by 7 tranches. So 7 tranches that BidderA had switched from Product-2 to Product-1 are rolled back to Product-2. Those 7 tranches are priced at the announced price for Product-2 at which they were bid in round 2: \$78.60.

After rolling back 7 tranches from Product-1 to Product-2 for BidderA, BidderA still has increased the number of tranches it is bidding on Product-1: from 50 tranches bid in round 2 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 40 tranches at \$72.50) to 92 tranches bid in round 3 (10 tranches at \$75.00 and 82 tranches at \$72.50). Product-1 is over-subscribed as a result, so higher-priced tranches in Product-1's bid stack can be removed. All 10 of BidderA's higher-priced tranches are removed from Product-1's bid stack, and these 10 tranches become BidderA's free eligibility for round 4. In round 4, BidderA can bid any of the 10 tranches on any product, but to the extent those 10 tranches are not bid on a product in round 4, those free eligibility tranches and their associated eligibility for BidderA will be permanently removed from the auction after round 4.

Because Product-1 is over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-1 will be reduced from \$72.50 to \$70.15 for round 4. Because Product-2 is not over-subscribed, the announced price for Product-2 will remain at \$76.10 for round 4.

BidderA will have eligibility of  $82+43+10 = 135$  tranches for round 4, and BidderB will have eligibility of  $50+57 = 107$  tranches for round 4 (including the 22 tranches rolled back on Product-2).

### Round 4

At the announced prices for round 4, BidderA bids 46 tranches and 43 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderA reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 82 to 46 tranches. BidderB bids 32 tranches and 57 tranches on Product-1 and Product-2, respectively. Thus, BidderB reduced its tranches bid on Product-1 from 50 to 32 tranches.

When the round closes the EOR procedure is executed. Product-1 is under-subscribed by 22 tranches: only 78 tranches bid against the tranche target of 100 tranches: BidderA's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 36 tranches, while BidderB's bid represents a reduction in its eligibility by 18 tranches. Of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1, 36 were eligibility reductions from BidderA and 18 were eligibility reductions from BidderB. Of those 54 fewer tranches bid,  $100-78 = 22$  tranches need to be rolled back on Product-1. The selection of which tranches are rolled back is done by assigning random numbers tranche by tranche (not bidder by bidder) to each of the 54 fewer tranches bid on Product-1. On average, the selection of the rolled back tranches will be proportional based on the number of tranches by which each bidder reduced its bid on the product. Thus, if the assignment of random numbers and selection of rolled back tranches were repeated many times, the number of rolled back tranches for BidderA on Product-1 would be expected to be 15 on average or  $(82-46)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 36/54*22$ , rounded, and the number of rolled back tranches for BidderB on Product-1 would be expected to be 7 on average:  $(50-32)/(132-78)*(100-78) = 18/54*22$ , rounded.

### **Auction Close**

After the rollback is done for Product-1, it is determined that no product is over-subscribed and no bidder has free eligibility tranches. Thus, the criteria are met for closing the auction.

Product-1's bid stack has tranches bid at \$72.50 and tranches bid at \$70.15. So Product-1's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$72.50. BidderA wins 61 tranches and BidderB wins 39 tranches for Product-1. All 100 tranches procured for Product-1 are paid the price of \$72.50.

Product-2's bid stack has tranches bid at \$78.60 and tranches bid at \$76.10. So Product-2's clearing price is the higher of the two, or \$78.60. BidderA wins 43 tranches and BidderB wins 57 tranches for Product-2. All 100 tranches procured for Product-2 are paid the price of \$78.60.

**Example 1. Round by Round Bidding with Pre-EOR and Post-EOR Results**

Round	Product-1					Product-2					Next-Round Eligibility	
	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Free	Total
1	\$75.00					\$82.00						
Pre-EOR		100	135		35		100	112		12		
BidderA			55	@ \$75.00				85	@ \$82.00		—	140
BidderB			80	@ \$75.00				27	@ \$82.00		—	107
Post-EOR		100	135		35		100	112		12		
BidderA			55	@ \$75.00				85	@ \$82.00		—	140
BidderB			80	@ \$75.00				27	@ \$82.00		—	107
2	\$72.50					\$78.60						
Pre-EOR		100	90		(10)		100	142		42		
BidderA			40	@ \$72.50				85	@ \$78.60		—	125
BidderB			50	@ \$72.50				57	@ \$78.60		—	107
Post-EOR		100	100		0		100	142		42		
BidderA			50	10 @ \$75.00 40 @ \$72.50				85	@ \$78.60		—	135
BidderB			50	@ \$72.50				57	@ \$78.60		—	107

Round	Product-1					Product-2					Next-Round Eligibility	
	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Free	Total
3	\$72.50					\$76.10						
Pre-EOR		100	149		49		100	71		(29)		
BidderA			99	10 @ \$75.00 89 @ \$72.50				36	@ \$76.10		—	135
BidderB			50	50 @ \$72.50				35	@ \$76.10		—	85
Post-EOR		100	132		32		100	100		0		
BidderA			82	@ \$72.50				43	7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10		10	135
BidderB			50	@ \$72.50				57	22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10		—	107

Round	Product-1					Product-2					Next-Round Eligibility	
	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Announced Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Bid	@ Price	Excess Supply	Free	Total
4	\$70.15					\$76.10						
Pre-EOR		100	78		(22)		100	100		0		
BidderA			46	@ \$70.15				43	7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10		—	89
BidderB			32	@ \$70.15				57	22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10		—	89
Post-EOR		100	100		0		100	100		0		
BidderA			61	15 @ \$72.50 46 @ \$70.15				43	7 @ \$78.60 36 @ \$76.10		—	104
BidderB			39	7 @ \$72.50 32 @ \$70.15				57	22 @ \$78.60 35 @ \$76.10		—	96

	Product-1				Product-2				Tranches Won
	Clearing Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Won		Clearing Price	Tranche Target	Tranches Won		
Results	\$72.50	100	100		\$78.60	100	100		100
BidderA			61				43		104
BidderB			39				57		96

## **APPENDIX B – RULES AND PROTOCOLS FOR PARTICIPATION BY ASSOCIATED BIDDERS**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

A Qualified Bidder is associated with another Qualified Bidder if the two bidders have ties that could allow them to act in concert or that could prevent them from competing actively against each other.

The competitiveness of the auction and the ability of the auction to produce competitive prices may be harmed by the coordinated or collusive behavior that bidding associations among bidders may facilitate. As a result, the Auction Manager has developed standards that apply when associated parties apply to participate in a CBP auction. The following sections outline the specific protocols that will be followed when associated entities submit Part 1 and/or Part 2 Applications to participate in a CBP auction for The Dayton Power and Light Company.

### **2. PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE AUCTION MANAGER**

Potential associations among participants may come to the attention of the Auction Manager at different points in the bidder qualification application process. In order to improve the process efficiency and minimize the risk of disclosure of potentially confidential information, the Auction Manager will approach each case as described below.

#### **2.1. Following the Receipt of the Part 1 Applications**

Potential associations among applicants may become apparent after the Part 1 Applications are submitted but before Qualified Bidders are required to disclose such associations as part of their Part 2 Applications. The Auction Manager will take no action related to potential associations until each party submits their completed Part 1 Application. In cases where there is an apparent relationship among applicants, the Auction Manager will initiate a request for additional information regarding the relationship among the potentially associated parties, the structure of their organization, and the independence of the respective bidding teams.

In such cases, the Auction Manager will notify representatives of The Dayton Power and Light Company, PUCO Staff, and the PUCO's consultant that there is a potential association among applicants.

In addition, as outlined in the Part 2 Application, the Auction Manager reserves the right to request additional information from each party including, but not necessarily limited to:

- a. Information on how the entity maintains its independence from the associated party including any available supporting documentation such as a Corporate Separation Agreements, Codes of Conduct, and/or organization charts;

- b. A list of individuals within the organization who have played or will play a material role in the CBP auction;
- c. Information regarding the nature of any work done in conjunction with or on behalf of the associated party;
- d. Information describing the organizational structure of the associate(s), identifying common management and oversight among the associated entities as well as the management involved in or responsible for bid approval;
- e. The internal process or protocol related to determining indicative offers submitted as part of the Part 2 Application;
- f. Disclosure of whether the entity is bidding on behalf of itself or acting as an agent for other entities.

Any responses to the above will be treated as confidential if labeled as such.

## **2.2. Following the Receipt of the Part 2 Applications**

In some cases, the potential relationship among Qualified Bidders will not be known to the Auction Manager until the Qualified Bidders submit final certifications along with their Part 2 Applications. In such cases, the Auction Manager will initiate the steps outlined above, upon receipt of the completed Part 2 Applications.

After the Auction Manager has requested and received additional information from each associated bidder, the Auction Manager will work with representatives of The Dayton Power and Light Company, PUCO Staff, and the PUCO's consultant to determine:

- a. Whether each of the associated bidders will be allowed to participate independently in the CBP auction; and
- b. Any restrictions that may be applied as a result of the participation by associated bidders.

Any restrictions will be based on the information provided by the associated bidders as part of the Part 1 Application, the Part 2 Application, and the additional information that was provided at the request of the Auction Manager.

## **3. REMEDIES AND ACTIONS RELATED TO PARTICIPATION BY ASSOCIATED BIDDERS**

This section summarizes the potential restrictions that will be considered by the Auction Manager, The Dayton Power and Light Company, PUCO Staff, and the PUCO's consultant in relationship to associated participation. Restrictions on participation may include, but may not be limited to, the following:

- a. Indicative offers may be restricted such that any applicable load cap or credit based tranche cap may apply across the associated bidders;



- b. Pre-bid security or collateral requirements may be altered for the associated bidders to ensure that associated bidders do not gain a competitive advantage over other bidders;
- c. In some cases, one or more associated bidders may not be allowed to participate in the CBP auction.

#### **4. HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

In order to execute the process of gathering information on associated entities and executing the remedies outlined above, there may be situations that require the Auction Manager to share, directly, certain confidential information among the associated parties, The Dayton Power and Light Company, the PUCO, its staff and/or the consultant hired by the PUCO to monitor the process.

In addition, as part of the remedies outlined above, an associated party may gain access to or be able to ascertain certain confidential information of the other associated entities. While access to such information otherwise may be counter to certifications in the Part 2 Application, access to such information acquired through the data gathering and remedies related to associated bidders will not be considered a violation of the CBP rules.<sup>1</sup>

Confidential information includes but may not be limited to the initial eligibility for each associated bidder based on indicative bids submitted with the Part 2 Application. The Auction Manager will make reasonable efforts to minimize the disclosure of any such confidential information.

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<sup>1</sup> Certification (5) from the Part 2 Application states: (5) Please certify that you do not have any knowledge of Confidential Information that is relevant to the bidding strategy of any other Qualified Bidder.